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CITIZEN	  RUFF:	  DO	  HUMANS	  HAVE	  POLITICAL	  
OBLIGATIONS	  TO	  ANIMALS?	  
Helena	  Silverstein	  *	  
SUE	  DONALDSON	  &	  WILL	  KYMLICKA,	  ZOOPOLIS:	  A	  POLITICAL	  THEORY	  OF	  ANIMAL	  RIGHTS	  (2011).	  Pp.	  264.	  Hardcover	  $29.95.	  	  KIMBERLY	  K.	  SMITH,	  GOVERNING	  ANIMALS:	  ANIMAL	  WELFARE	  AND	  THE	  LIBERAL	  STATE	  (2012).	  Pp.	  240.	  Hardcover	  $34.95.	  	  In	  a	  recent	  New	  York	  Times	  column,	  Nicolas	  D.	  Kristof	  asks	  the	  following	  ques-­‐tion:	  “Some	  day,	  will	  our	  descendants	  be	  mystified	  by	  how	  good	  and	  decent	  people	  in	  the	  early	  21st	  century—that’s	  us—could	  have	  been	  so	  oblivious	  to	  the	  unethical	  treatment	  of	  animals?”1	  Though	  he	  does	  not	  answer	  the	  question,	  Kristof	  compares	  the	   progress	   and	   contradictions	   in	   the	   development	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   animal	  rights:	   	  We	  have	  the	  same	  inconsistencies,	  controversies	  and	  hypocrisies	  in	  dealing	  with	  human	  rights.	  We	  may	  disagree	  about	  waterboarding	  terror	   suspects,	   but	   almost	   everyone	   shares	   a	   revulsion	   for	   geno-­‐cide,	  the	  use	  of	  poison	  gas	  or	  the	  torture	  of	  children.	  Now	   we	   are	   plodding	   along	   a	   similar	   controversial,	   incon-­‐sistent,	  hypocritical—and	  progressive—path	  on	  animal	   rights.	  We	  may	  disagree	  about	  eating	  meat,	  but	  growing	  numbers	  share	  a	  dis-­‐gust	   for	   extreme	   behavior,	   like	   the	   force-­‐feeding	   of	   geese	   (now	  banned	  in	  California)	  to	  produce	  pâté.	  We	  as	  a	  global	  society	  have	  crossed	  the	  Rubicon.	  We	  disagree	  about	  where	   to	  draw	   the	   line	   to	  protect	  animal	   rights,	  but	  almost	  everyone	  now	  agrees	  that	  there	  is	  a	  line	  to	  be	  drawn.2	  	  Kristof	  was	  moved	  to	  pose	  his	  question	  and	  offer	  his	  commentary	  after	  read-­‐ing	  a	  review	  of	  Blackfish,	  a	  new	  documentary	  about	  the	  treatment	  of	  captive	  whales	  in	  marine	  parks	  and	  the	  consequences	  to	  the	  whales	  and	  their	  handlers.3	  The	  film	  
                                                            	   *	   Professor,	  Department	  of	  Government	  and	  Law,	  Lafayette	  College.	  	  	  	   1.	  	   See	   Nicolas	   D.	   Kristof,	   Can	   We	   See	   Our	   Hypocrisy	   to	   Animals?,	   N.Y.	   TIMES,	   July	   28,	   2013,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/opinion/sunday/can-­‐we-­‐see-­‐our-­‐hypocrisy-­‐to-­‐animals.html?_r=0.	  	   2.	  	   Id.	  	  	   3.	  	   BLACKFISH	  (Dogwoof	  2013).	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does	  not	  make	  a	  broad	  argument	  as	  to	  where	  lines	  should	  be	  drawn	  with	  respect	  to	  nonhuman	  animals.	  But	  according	  to	  one	  reviewer,	  it	  “makes	  a	  strong	  case	  that	  the	  whales	  are	  incredibly	  intelligent,	  evolved	  creatures	  that	  aren’t	  suited	  for	  small	  pens,	  no	   matter	   how	   cute	   and	   humanlike	   we	   think	   these	   animals	   are	   when	   they	  do	  tricks.”4	  The	  film’s	  “message	  is	  clear:	  Killer	  whales	  belong	  with	  their	  families	  in	  their	  natural	  habitat,	  not	  performing	  for	  audiences”5	  and	  “keeping	  killer	  whales,	  or	  orcas,	  in	  captivity	  is	  an	  unavoidably	  cruel	  thing	  to	  do.”6	  Furthermore,	  “what	  seems	  indisputable	  is	  that	  these	  marine	  mammals	  are	  amazing	  and	  inspiring,	  and	  they	  de-­‐serve	  to	  be	  protected	  and	  cherished,	  not	  exploited	  .	  .	  .	  .	  ‘Blackfish’	  seems	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  rare	  film	  that	  inspires	  real	  reform	  and	  that	  helps	  awaken	  viewers	  to	  their	  kin-­‐ship	  and	  responsibility	  to	  the	  animal	  kingdom.”7	  Debates	  about	  line	  drawing	  are,	  in	  part,	  about	  the	  extent	  of	  human	  responsi-­‐bility	  to	  the	  animal	  kingdom	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  kinship.	  In	  Blackfish,	  a	  professor	  and	  former	  whale	  trainer	  describes	  the	  intelligence	  and	  personality	  of	  killer	  whales	  in	   this	  way:	   “When	  you	   look	   into	   their	   eyes,	   you	  know	  somebody	   is	   home.”8	  This	  characterization	   evokes,	   at	   least,	   relationship,	   empathy,	   and	   kinship.	   And	   after	  watching	   the	   documentary’s	   depiction	   of	   mistreatment	   of	   orcas,	   one	   reviewer	  commented	  that	  “[y]ou	  don’t	  have	  to	  be	  anything	  close	  to	  a	  PETA	  loyalist	  or	  an	  an-­‐thropomorphist	   to	   appreciate	   the	   genuine	   sorrow	   and	   eventual	   psychosis	   on	   dis-­‐play	  in	  footage	  of	  these	  whales.”9	  It	   is,	   of	   course,	   not	   just	   bad	   treatment	  of	  whales	   that	   elicits	   such	   responses,	  questions,	  and	  calls	   for	  reform.	  At	   the	  end	  of	   June	  2013,	   the	  National	   Institutes	  of	  Health	  (“NIH”)	  announced	  new	  and	  strict	  guidelines	  for	  the	  use	  of	  chimpanzees	  in	  experiments,	  as	  well	  as	  regulations	  for	  their	  housing	  and	  treatment.10	  The	  NIH	  will	  retire	  about	  310	  chimps	  to	  sanctuaries,	  maintain	  a	  “colony	  of	  up	  to	  50	  [chimps]	  .	  .	  .	  in	  case	  there	  is	  a	  compelling	  need	  to	  use	  them	  in	  research,”	  and	  proffer	  “new	  guide-­‐lines	  .	  .	  .	  for	  any	  future	  research	  and	  for	  chimpanzee	  housing.”11	  Explaining	  the	  new	  policy,	  NIH	  Director	  Dr.	   Francis	   S.	   Collins	   described	   chimpanzees	   as	   “very	   special	  animals”	  and	  “our	  closest	  relatives.”12	  He	  further	  stated	  that	  “[w]e	  believe	  they	  de-­‐serve	  special	  consideration	  as	  special	  creatures.”13	  Shortly	   before	   the	   release	   of	   NIH’s	   new	   policy,	   the	   United	   States	   Fish	   and	  
                                                            	   4.	  	   David	   Lewis,	   ‘Blackfish’	   Review:	   Doom	   Looms	   in	   Orca’s	   Story,	   S.F.	   CHRON.,	   July	   25,	   2013,	  http://www.sfgate.com/movies/article/Blackfish-­‐review-­‐Doom-­‐looms-­‐in-­‐orca-­‐s-­‐story-­‐4686737.php.	  	   5.	  	   Moira	  Macdonald,	   ‘Blackfish’:	  The	  Troubled	  Lives	  of	  Captive	  Killer	  Whales,	   SEATTLE	  TIMES,	  Aug.	  1,	  2013,	  http://seattletimes.com/html/movies/2021520922_blackfishmoviexml.html.	  	   6.	  	   Marc	  Mohan,	   ‘Blackfish’	  Review:	  Documentary	  Wants	   to	  Free	   the	  Whales,	   THE	  OREGONIAN,	  Aug.	  8,	  2013,	  http://www.oregonlive.com/movies/index.ssf/2013/08/review_blackfish_wants_to_free.html.	  	   7.	  	   John	   Beifuss,	   ‘Blackfish’—A	   Review:	   Species	   Slavery,	   THE	   COMMERCIAL	   APPEAL,	   Aug.	   8,	   2013,	  http://blogs.commercialappeal.com/the_bloodshot_eye/2013/08/blackfish-­‐-­‐-­‐a-­‐review.html.	  	   8.	  	   Macdonald,	  supra	  note	  5	  (quoting	  	  BLACKFISH,	  supra	  note	  3).	  	   9.	  	   Mohan,	  supra	  note	  6.	  	   10.	  	   James	   Gorman,	   U.S.	   to	   Begin	   Retiring	   Most	   Research	   Chimps,	   N.Y.	   TIMES,	   June	   27,	   2013,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/science/us-­‐to-­‐retire-­‐most-­‐chimps-­‐from-­‐research.html.	  	   11.	  	   Id.	  	   12.	  	   Id.	  	   13.	  	   Geoff	  Brumfiel,	  NIH	  Takes	  Another	  Step	  toward	  Retirement	  of	  Research	  Chimps,	  NPR	  NEWS,	  	  (June	  26,	  2013),	  http://m.npr.org/news/Science/195926114.	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Wildlife	  Service	  proposed	  extending	  Endangered	  Species	  Act	  (“ESA”)	  protection	  to	  captive	  chimpanzees.14	  Daniel	  M.	  Ashe,	  the	  director	  of	  the	  Fish	  and	  Wildlife	  Service,	  also	   cited	   the	   close	   connection	  between	  humans	   and	   chimps:	   “The	   chimpanzee	   is	  said	  to	  share	  98	  percent	  of	  our	  genes”	  and	  “[i]t	  is	  in	  our	  nature	  to	  protect	  and	  con-­‐serve	   this	   iconic	   species,	   and	   this	   proposal	  will	   help.”15	   The	   federal	   agency’s	   pro-­‐posal,	  “a	  long	  time	  in	  the	  works,	  [was]	  a	  response	  to	  a	  petition	  filed	  in	  2010	  by	  the	  Humane	   Society	   of	   the	  United	   States,	   the	   Jane	  Goodall	   Institute	   and	   other	   groups	  with	   concerns	   about	  biomedical	   research	  on	   chimpanzees	   and	   the	  use	   of	   the	   ani-­‐mals	  in	  advertisements	  and	  entertainment.”16	  According	  to	  a	  New	  York	  Times	  article	  by	  James	  Gorman:	  	  	   If	  the	  new	  rule	  is	  enacted,	  it	  will	  be	  a	  major	  success	  for	  animal	  wel-­‐fare	  groups,	  a	  grave	  disappointment	  for	  some	  scientists	  and	  anoth-­‐er	   sign	   of	   the	   profound	   changes	   over	   the	   last	   half-­‐century	   in	   the	  way	  animals	  are	  used	  and	  imagined	  in	  science	  and	  popular	  culture.	  	  	  “What	   the	   chimpanzee	   has	   done	   is	   to	   prove	   there	   is	   no	   hard	   and	  fast	   line	   dividing	   us	   from	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   animal	   kingdom,”	   Dr.	  Goodall	   said	   Friday.	   “That’s	   the	   greatest	   gift	   the	   chimpanzee	   has	  given	  those	  of	  us	  who	  care	  about	  animal	  welfare.17	  	  The	  link	  between	  humans	  and	  chimpanzees	  is	  cited	  here	  as	  grounds	  for	  eras-­‐ing	   lines	  and	  dissolving	  distinctions.	  At	   the	  same	   time,	   implicit	   in	  highlighting	   the	  common	  genetic	  link	  to	  these	  closest	  of	  relatives	  and	  their	  “iconic”	  character	  is	  the	  suggestion	   that	   those	   animals	   further	   removed	   from	   humans	   might	   fall	   outside	  zones	  of	  protection	  and	  consideration.	  	  Of	   course,	   there	   have	   long	   been	   cautions	   against	   anthropomorphizing	   as	   a	  way	  to	  blur	  the	  lines	  between	  humans	  and	  animals.	  Indeed,	  according	  to	  Goodall,	  “I	  could	  not	  talk	  about	  chimpanzees	  having	  personalities.”18	  “That,”	  she	  said,	  “was	  the	  worst	   anthropomorphic	   sin.”19	   But	   some	   versions	   of	   anthropomorphizing—or,	  more	   accurately,	   examining	   the	   similarities	   between	   humans	   and	   nonhuman	   ani-­‐mals	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  determining	  the	  kind	  of	  moral,	  legal,	  and	  political	  consid-­‐erations	  animals	  deserve—have	  become	  commonplace	   in	  efforts	   to	  draw,	   redraw,	  and	   even	   erase	   lines.	   Philosophers,	   political	   theorists,	   bioethicists,	   legal	   scholars,	  and	  others	  within	  and	  beyond	  the	  academy	  have	  worked	  to	  delineate	  whether,	  on	  
                                                            	   14.	  	   See	  James	  Gorman,	  U.S.	  Proposes	  Wildlife	  Protection	  for	  Captive	  Chimps,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  June	  11,	  2013,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/us/us-­‐moves-­‐to-­‐declare-­‐captive-­‐chimps-­‐endangered.html	  [hereinafter	  Gorman,	  Wildlife	  Protection].	  Though	  the	  ESA	  covers	  wild	  chimpanzees,	  it	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  chimps	  in	  captivity.	  Id.	  	   15.	  	   James	  Gorman,	  Goal	  of	  Broader	  Protection	   for	  Chimpanzees	  Emerges	   from	  Changing	  Perspectives,	  N.Y.	   TIMES,	   June	   16,	   2013,	   http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/science/goal-­‐of-­‐broader-­‐protection-­‐for-­‐chimpanzees-­‐emerges-­‐from-­‐changing-­‐perspectives.html?pagewanted=all	   [hereinafter	   Gorman,	  
Changing	  Perspectives].	  	   16.	  	   Gorman,	  Wildlife	  Protection,	  supra	  note	  14.	  	  	   17.	  	   Gorman,	  Changing	  Perspectives,	  supra	  note	  15.	  	   18.	  	   Id.	  	   19.	  	   Id.	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what	  grounds,	  and	  where	  lines	  should	  be	  drawn.	  For	  example,	  some	  follow	  Imman-­‐uel	  Kant’s	  view	  that	  because	  humans	  and	  nonhumans	  are	  distinguishable	  in	  terms	  of	   their	   capacities	   for	   rational	   thought,	   nonhumans	   are	  mere	   things	   to	  whom	  hu-­‐mans	  have	  no	  direct	  obligations.20	  Some	  counter	  that	  the	  higher	  cognitive	  capacities	  of	  humans	  notwithstanding,	  because	  nonhumans	  have	  an	   interest	   in	  avoiding	  suf-­‐fering,	  they	  are	  worthy	  of	  moral	  consideration.21	  Still	  others	  subscribe	  to	  “the	  simi-­‐lar-­‐minds	   theory”	   of	   the	   human/animal	   relationship,	   which	   holds	   that	   some	  (though	  not	  all)	  nonhumans	  have	  certain	  cognitive	  qualities	  akin	  to	  humans,	  such	  as	  “self-­‐awareness,	   emotions,	   and	   the	   ability	   to	   communicate	   with	   a	   symbolic	   lan-­‐guage,”	  and	  that	  having	  these	  characteristics	  justifies	  “inclusion	  within	  the	  commu-­‐nity	  of	  equals.”22	  	  	  
Zoopolis23	  and	  Governing	  Animals24	  present	  new	  conceptualizations	  of	  human-­‐animal	   relations.	   Both	   seek	   to	   delineate	   the	  political	   obligations	   humans	   have	   to-­‐ward	   nonhuman	   animals.	   They	   do	   so	   by	   drawing	   on	   related	   concepts.	   Sue	   Don-­‐aldson	  and	  Will	  Kymlicka,	   authors	  of	  Zoopolis:	  A	  Political	  Theory	  of	  Animal	  Rights,	  apply	   citizenship	   theory	   to	   present	   an	   account	   of	   human	   relationships	   with	   ani-­‐mals.25	  Kimberly	  K.	  Smith,	  author	  of	  Governing	  Animals:	  Animal	  Welfare	  and	  the	  Lib-­‐
eral	  State,	  deploys	  liberal	  political	  theory,	  particularly	  social	  contract	  theory,	  to	  ex-­‐plore	   whether	   and	   how	   the	   liberal	   state	   can	   defend	   animal	   welfare.26	   The	  arguments	  offered	  by	  Donaldson	  and	  Kymlicka	  suggest	  that	  humans	  have	  a	  number	  of	  robust	  positive	  obligations	  to	  those	  nonhumans	  who	  are	  properly	  understood	  as	  “co-­‐citizens,”	   “sovereigns,”	   and	   “denizens.”27	   Smith	   argues,	   similarly,	   that	   humans	  have	  a	  number	  of	  duties	  to	  those	  nonhumans	  who	  are	  properly	  understood	  as	  being	  members	  of	  the	  social	  contract.28	  Not	  all	  animals,	  though,	  fall	  under	  the	  categories	  set	  forth	  by	  Donaldson,	  Kymlicka,	  and	  Smith.	  The	  duties	  owed	  to	  animals	  vary	  de-­‐pending	  on	  their	  status	  within	  the	  citizenship	  and	  social	  contract	  frameworks.	  In	  what	   follows,	   I	   briefly	   outline	   the	   arguments	   put	   forward	   by	   Donaldson,	  Kymlicka,	  and	  Smith.	  I	  suggest	  that	  while	  Nicolas	  Kristof	  is	  correct	  in	  saying	  that	  we	  are	  approaching	  consensus	  that	  there	  is	  a	  line	  to	  be	  drawn,29	  what	  these	  two	  books	  demonstrate	   is	   how	   far	   away	  we	  are	   from	  consensus	  on	  where	   and	  how	   to	  draw	  lines.	  Because	  these	  works	  are	  situated	  within	  the	  same	  strand	  of	  thought—that	  is,	  liberal	   political	   theory—one	   might	   expect	   that	   they	   would	   be	   relatively	   close	   in	  
                                                            	   20.	  	   For	  a	  discussion	  of	  Immanuel	  Kant’s	  views	  about	  animals,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Lori	  Gruen,	  The	  Moral	  Status	  of	  
Animals,	   STANFORD	   ENCYCLOPEDIA	   OF	   PHIL.	   (Edward	   N.	   Zalta	   ed.,	   2012),	   available	   at	  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/moral-­‐animal/.	  	   21.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  PETER	  SINGER,	  ANIMAL	  LIBERATION	  (2d	  ed.	  1990).	  	   22.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  Gary	  L.	  Francione,	  Taking	  Sentience	  Seriously,	  1	  J.	  ANIMAL	  L.	  &	  ETHICS	  1,	  2-­‐3	  (2006).	  Fran-­‐cione	  is	  critical	  of	  the	  similar-­‐minds	  theory,	  and	  argues	  instead	  for	  position	  that	  “sentience	  alone	  is	  suffi-­‐cient	  for	  full	  membership	  in	  the	  moral	  community	  and	  that	  no	  other	  cognitive	  characteristic	  is	  required.”	  
Id.	  	   23.	  	   SUE	  DONALDSON	  &	  WILL	  KYMLICKA,	  ZOOPOLIS:	  A	  POLITICAL	  THEORY	  OF	  ANIMAL	  RIGHTS	  (2011).	  	   24.	  	   KIMBERLY	  K.	  SMITH,	  GOVERNING	  ANIMALS:	  ANIMAL	  WELFARE	  AND	  THE	  LIBERAL	  STATE	  (2012).	  	   25.	  	   DONALDSON	  &	  KYMLICKA,	  supra	  note	  23,	  at	  14.	  	  	   26.	  	   SMITH,	  supra	  at	  note	  24,	  at	  vii.	  	   27.	  	   DONALDSON	  &	  KYMLICKA,	  supra	  note	  23,	  at	  101,	  169,	  210.	  	  	   28.	  	   SMITH,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	  41.	  	  	   29.	  	   See	  Kristof,	  supra	  note	  1.	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thinking.	   In	  addition,	  because	   liberal	   theoretical	  notions	  of	  citizenship	  and	   the	  so-­‐cial	  contract	  are	  related,	  extending	  these	  to	  animals	  might	  produce	  similar	  conclu-­‐sions.	  However,	  Zoopolis	   and	  Governing	   Animals	   present	   visions	   of	   human-­‐animal	  relations	  and	  obligations	  that	  are	  far	  apart.	  I.	  ANIMALS	  AS	  CITIZENS,	  SOVEREIGNS,	  AND	  DENIZENS:	  ZOOPOLIS	  Donaldson	   and	   Kymlicka	   begin	   by	   asserting	   that	   “[t]he	   animal	   advocacy	  movement	   is	   at	   an	   impasse”30	   and	   by	   presenting	   their	   work	   as	   an	   effort	   to	   gain	  some	  forward	  momentum.	  They	  also	  briefly	  outline	  the	  primary	  moral	  frameworks	  used	  to	  examine	  animal	   issues—the	  welfarist,	  ecological,	  and	  animal	  rights	  frame-­‐works—and	  align	  with	  the	  “core	  premise”	  of	  the	  latter,	  saying	  that	  “[t]he	  only	  truly	  effective	   protection	   against	   animal	   exploitation	   requires	   shifting	   from	   welfarism	  and	   ecological	   holism	   to	   a	   moral	   framework	   that	   acknowledges	   animals	   as	   the	  bearers	  of	  certain	  inviolable	  rights.”31	  Before	  defending	  that	  claim	  in	  greater	  detail,	  the	   authors	   suggest	   that	   animal	   rights	   theory	   (“ART”)	   has	   notable	   shortcomings	  that	   they	  hope	  to	  overcome.32	  The	  problem	  with	   traditional	  ART,	  on	   their	  view,	   is	  that	  it	  is	  simultaneously	  too	  narrow	  and	  too	  broad.	  Its	  narrowness	  derives	  from	  its	  focus	   on	   negative	   rights,	   such	   as	   not	   being	   killed,	   tortured,	   and	   exploited.33	   Its	  broadness	   owes	   to	   the	   application	   of	   these	   negative	   rights	   “generically	   to	   all	   ani-­‐mals	   possessing	   a	   subjective	   existence—that	   is,	   to	   all	   animals	   that	   have	   some	  threshold	  level	  of	  consciousness	  or	  sentience.”34	  This	  approach	  suggests	  that	  ethical	  treatment	  of	  animals	  entails	  noninterference,	   that	   is,	   “leaving	  them	  alone.”35	  Thus,	  according	  to	  Donaldson	  and	  Kymlicka,	  “ART	  flattens	  our	  moral	  landscape	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  not	  only	  intellectually	  implausible	  but	  unattractive:	  it	  ignores	  the	  inevitabil-­‐ity	  of,	  and	  desire	  for,	  ongoing	  and	  morally	  significant	  relationships	  with	  animals.”36	  Challenging	   ART’s	   “abolitionist/extinctionist”	   approach,37	   Donaldson	   and	  Kymlicka	   present	   a	  more	   complicated	   and	   nuanced	   framework.	   They	   cast	   animal	  rights	   as	   relational	   rather	   than	   universal,	   emphasizing	   the	   varied	   and	   situational	  interactions	  we	  have	  with	  nonhumans,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  interest	  in	  and	  inevitability	  of	  these	   interactions.38	   “We	   are	   part	   of	   a	   shared	   society	  with	   innumerable	   animals”	  and	  it	  is	  “simply	  not	  tenable	  for	  ART	  to	  assume	  that	  humans	  can	  inhabit	  a	  separate	  realm	   from	   other	   animals	   in	   which	   interaction,	   and	   therefore	   potential	   conflict,	  could	  largely	  be	  eliminated.”39	  Acknowledging	  the	  necessity	  and	  indeed	  desirability	  of	  human-­‐animal	  interaction,	  Donaldson	  and	  Kymlicka	  press	  for	  recognition	  of	  the	  positive	  duties	  humans	  owe	  to	  nonhumans:	  
                                                            	   30.	  	   DONALDSON	  &	  KYMLICKA,	  supra	  note	  23,	  at	  1.	  	   31.	  	   Id.	  at	  4.	  	   32.	  	   Id.	  at	  5.	  	   33.	  	   Id.	  at	  5-­‐6.	  	   34.	  	   Id.	  at	  6.	  	   35.	  	   	  Id.	  at	  9.	  	   36.	  	   Id.	  at	  10.	  	   37.	  	   Id.	  at	  79.	  	   38.	  	   Id.	  at	  8,	  11.	  	  	   39.	  	   Id.	  at	  8.	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   For	  example,	   certain	   social	   relationships	   (e.g.,	   parent-­‐child,	   teach-­‐er-­‐student,	   employer-­‐employee)	   generate	   stronger	   duties	   of	   care	  because	  of	  the	  dependencies	  and	  power	  asymmetries	  involved.	  Po-­‐litical	  relationships	  .	  .	  .	  also	  generate	  positive	  duties,	  because	  of	  the	  distinctive	   rights	   and	   responsibilities	   of	   citizenship	   involved	   in	  governing	  bounded	  communities	  and	  territories.40	  	  The	  authors	  thus	  argue	  that	  “[a]	  central	  task	  of	  any	  plausible	  theory	  of	  animal	  rights	   .	  .	  .	   is	  to	  identify	  analogous	  categories	  for	  the	  animal	  context,	  sorting	  out	  the	  various	   patterns	   of	   human-­‐animal	   relationships	   and	   their	   associated	   positive	   du-­‐ties.”41	  Accepting	  that	  animals	  have	  rights	  and	  working	  to	  identify	  these	  categories,	  the	  authors	  set	  out	  to	  show	  “how	  ART,	  when	  specified	  to	  include	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  duties,	  sets	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  these	  interactions	  can	  be	  respect-­‐ful,	  mutually	  enriching,	  and	  non-­‐exploitative.”42	  Before	  developing	  these	  specifications,	  Donaldson	  and	  Kymlicka	  explain	  why	  we	  should	  see	  most	  animals	  as	  rights-­‐bearing	  beings.	  They	  summarize	  and	  accept	  the	   foundational	   arguments	   put	   forward	   by	   ART,	   which,	   put	   briefly,	   posits	   that	  “[c]onscious/sentient	  beings	  are	  selves—that	   is,	   they	  have	  a	  distinctive	  subjective	  experience	   of	   their	   own	   lives	   and	  of	   the	  world,	  which	  demands	   a	   specific	   kind	  of	  protection	  in	  the	  form	  of	  inviolable	  rights.”43	  Putting	  it	  in	  the	  same	  words	  as	  one	  of	  the	   former	   trainers	   interviewed	   in	  Blackfish,	   Donaldson	   and	   Kymlicka	   argue	   that	  rights	  apply	  “whenever	  we	  encounter	  ‘someone	  home.’”44	  After	  defending	  this	  theo-­‐ry	   against	   objections,	   the	   authors	   concede	   its	   dramatic	   implications:	   certain	   “uni-­‐versal	  negative	   rights—the	   right	  not	   to	  be	   tortured,	   experimented	  on,	  owned,	   en-­‐slaved,	   imprisoned,	   or	   killed”	   extend	   to	   animals.45	   Respecting	   these	   rights	  means	  ending	  various	  practices,	   including	   farming,	  hunting,	   animal	  experimentation,	   and	  so	  forth.46	  Nevertheless,	  Donaldson	  and	  Kymlicka	  critique	  the	  standard	  versions	  of	  ART	  
                                                            	   40.	  	   Id.	  at	  8-­‐9.	  	   41.	  	   Id.	  at	  9.	  	   42.	  	   Id.	  at	  10.	  	   43.	   Id.	  at	  24.	  	   44.	  	   Id.	  at	  25	  (quoting	  Barbara	  Smuts,	  Encounters	  with	  Animal	  Minds,	  8	  J.	  OF	  CONSCIOUSNESS	  STUD.	  293,	  308	  (2001)).	  	   45.	  	   	  DONALDSON	  &	  KYMLICKA,	  supra	  note	  23,	  at	  49.	  Donaldson	  and	  Kymlicka	  do	  not	  definitively	  specify	  which	  animals	  are	  conscious	  or	  sentient:	  	  The	  truth	  is,	  we	  may	  never	  be	  able	  to	  fully	  answer	  this	  question	  .	   .	   .	   .	  Are	  molluscs	  conscious?	  Insects?	  The	  evidence	  to	  date	  suggests	  they	  are	  not,	  but	  this	  may	  just	  re-­‐flect	   the	   fact	   that	  we	  are	   looking	   for	  a	  distinctly	  human	  form	  of	  subjective	  experi-­‐ence,	  and	  not	  considering	  other	  possible	  forms.	  	  
Id.	  at	  31.	  Still,	  the	  authors	  insist	  that	  this	  difficulty	  doesn’t	   change	   the	   fact	   that	   we	   can	   readily	   identify	   [consciousness]	   in	   many	   in-­‐stances.	   Indeed,	   the	   types	   of	   animals	   that	   are	   most	   cruelly	   abused	   are	   precisely	  those	  whose	  consciousness	  is	  least	  in	  doubt	  .	  .	  .	  .	  To	  invoke	  the	  difficulty	  of	  determin-­‐ing	  a	  threshold	  of	  basic	  consciousness	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  continuing	  animal	  exploi-­‐tation	  is	  dishonest.	  
Id.	  	   46.	  	   Id	  at	  49.	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for	  mistakenly	   holding	   that	   respect	   for	   rights	   requires	   prohibition	   of	   all	   or	  most	  human-­‐animal	   interaction.	   “Ending	   the	   human	   exploitation	   of	   animals	   is	   a	   neces-­‐sary	  start,	  but	  we	  need	  to	  know	  what	  non-­‐exploitative	  relations	  might	  look	  like.	  .	  .	  .	  And	  what	   kinds	   of	   positive	   obligations	   do	  we	   owe	   to	   animals	   .	   .	   .	   ?”47	  Here,	   Don-­‐aldson	  and	  Kymlicka	  turn	  to	  citizenship	  theory	  to	  advance	  a	  modified	  and	  extended	  version	  of	  ART.48	  Citizenship	  theory	  begins	  with	  the	  premise	  that	  humans	  have	  certain	  inviola-­‐ble	  and	  universal	  rights	  because	  they	  are	  “persons”	  or	  members	  of	  the	  moral	  com-­‐munity.	  The	  existence	  of	  such	  generalized	  rights	  does	  not	  preclude	  the	  existence	  of	  particularized	  rights	  and	  duties	  that	  obtain	  because	  of	  situational	  and	  political	  rela-­‐tionships.	   In	  other	  words,	  humans	  have	  not	  only	  universal	   rights	  but	  also	  specific	  rights	   that	   apply	   because	   they	   are	   “citizens”	   or	   members	   of	   a	   bounded	   political	  community.	   “Citizenship,	   in	  short,	  generates	  distinctive	  rights	  and	  responsibilities,	  beyond	   the	   universal	   human	   rights	   owed	   to	   all	   persons,	   including	   foreigners.”49	  There	  are,	  furthermore,	  other	  categories	  that	  generate	  particularized	  sets	  of	  rights	  and	   obligations.	   These	   include	   “sovereigns”	   who	   are	   self-­‐governing	   sub-­‐communities	  that	  exist	  within	  territorial	  boundaries	  of	  larger	  political	  communities	  (e.g.,	   indigenous	   people)	   and	   “denizens”	  who	   reside	   inside	   a	   political	   community	  without	  being	  full	  members	  of	  that	  community	  (e.g.,	  migrant	  workers).50	  The	  bulk	  of	  Zoopolis	  is	  spent	  applying	  the	  concept	  of	  citizenship,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  related	   concepts	   of	   sovereignty	   and	   denizenship,	   to	   the	   human-­‐animal	   relation-­‐ship.51	  This	   first	  requires	  re-­‐theorizing	  citizenship,	  which	   is	   typically	  connected	  to	  active	  political	  participation	  and	  thus	  thought	  to	  disqualify	  animals.	  Donaldson	  and	  Kymlicka	  cast	  the	  functions	  of	  citizenship	  in	  terms	  of	  nationality	  (the	  right	  to	  reside	  in	  a	  particular	   territory),52	  popular	  sovereignty	  (representation	  of	   the	  will	  and	   in-­‐terests	  of	  members),53	  and	  democratic	  political	  agency	  (exercising	  the	  right	  and	  re-­‐sponsibility	  to	  shape	  laws	  and	  governance).54	  The	  first	  two	  functions	  easily	  extend	  to	  nonhumans,	  but	  the	  third	  function	  is	  trickier,	  since	  animals	  cannot	  engage	  as	  po-­‐litical	   agents.	  Donaldson	  and	  Kymlicka	   revise	   citizenship	   theory	  by	  drawing	  upon	  insights	   from	  disability	   theory	   to	  argue	   that	   the	  capacity	   for	   independent	  political	  agency	   is	  not	   a	  necessary	   condition	   for	   citizenship.55	   “It	   is	   a	   serious	  mistake,”	   the	  authors	  insist,	  “to	  treat	  political	  agency	  as	  a	  threshold	  or	  criterion	  that	  determines	  
who	  is	  a	  citizen,	  such	  that	  those	  who	  are	  incapable	  of	  this	  or	  that	  form	  of	  agency	  are	  relegated	  to	  a	  status	  of	  non-­‐citizenship.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  this	  would	  have	  the	  per-­‐verse	  effect	  of	  excluding	  children	  and	  the	  mentally	  disabled	  from	  citizenship.”56	  In-­‐stead,	   facilitating	  representation	  of	  dependents	  serves	  to	  satisfy	  the	  third	  function	  
                                                            	   47.	  	   	  Id.	  	   48.	  	   Id.	  at	  50.	  	   49.	  	   Id.	  at	  13.	  	   50.	  	   Id.	  	  	   51.	  	   See	  generally	  id.	  	  	   52.	  	   Id.	  at	  55.	  	   53.	  	   	  Id.	  at	  55-­‐56.	  	   54.	  	   Id.	  at	  56.	  	   55.	  	   Id.	  at	  105.	  	   56.	  	   Id.	  at	  58.	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of	  citizenship.	  By	  developing	  “forms	  of	  dependent	  agency,”	  we	  can	  extend	  the	  um-­‐brella	  of	  citizenship	  to	  some	  animals.57	  The	  authors	  proceed	  to	  make	  the	  case	  for	  seeing	  domesticated	  animals,	  such	  as	  pets	  and	  farm	  animals,	  as	  co-­‐citizens.	  They	  contend	  that	  respect	  for	  animal	  rights	  does	  not	  entail	  ending	  relationships	  with	  domesticated	  animals.	   Just	  as	  the	  appro-­‐priate	  response	  to	  ending	  slavery	  was	  not	  abolishing	  the	  existence	  of	  former	  slaves,	  the	  end	  of	  the	   injustices	  associated	  with	  domestication	  is	  not	  the	  extinction	  of	  do-­‐mesticated	  species.58	  Instead,	  we	  can	  maintain	  relations	  with	  pets	  and	  farm	  animals	  as	  long	  as	  we	  end	  our	  exploitation	  of	  them	  and	  facilitate	  their	  status	  as	  animal	  co-­‐citizens.	   For	   example,	   we	   can	   develop	   non-­‐exploitative	   conditions	   for	   interacting	  with	  sheep	  and	  chickens	  that	  allow	  some	  human	  consumption	  of	  wool	  and	  eggs.	  We	  can	  “imagine	  citizen	  chickens	  whose	  rights	  are	   fully	  protected,	  and	  who	  enjoy	   the	  same	  rights	  as	  other	  citizens	  to	  be	  supported	  in	  leading	  a	  flourishing	  life”59	  and,	  at	  the	   same	   time,	   envision	   humans	   living	   alongside	   their	   “chicken	   companions”	   and	  consuming	  some	  of	  the	  chickens’	  eggs.60	  Not	  all	  animals	  fit	  this	  model	  of	  co-­‐citizenship.	  Donaldson	  and	  Kymlicka	  iden-­‐tify	   two	  categories	  of	  wild	  animals	   toward	  which	  we	  have	  certain	  positive	  obliga-­‐tions,	   albeit	   distinct	   from	   the	   co-­‐citizenship	  model.	   First	   are	   “‘truly	  wild’	   animals,	  that	  is,	  those	  animals	  who	  avoid	  humans	  and	  human	  settlement,	  maintaining	  a	  sep-­‐arate	  and	  independent	  existence	  (insofar	  as	  they	  are	  able	  to)	  in	  their	  own	  shrinking	  habitats	  or	  territories.”61	  Mountain	  lions,	  wolves,	  and	  bears,	  for	  example,	  should	  be	  seen	   as	   “wild	   animal	   sovereigns.”62	   Trapping,	   hunting,	   and	   other	   violence	   toward	  these	   animals	   is	   impermissible,	   as	   traditional	   ART	   holds.	   Additionally,	   Donaldson	  and	  Kymlicka	  contend	  that	  we	  should	  respect	  “the	  right	  of	  wild	  animal	  communities	  to	   lead	   autonomous,	   self-­‐directed	   lives,”63	   recognize	   that	  wild	   animal	  habitats	   are	  inhabited	  lands,	  and	  acknowledge	  “that	  existing	  inhabitants	  have	  the	  right	  to	  main-­‐tain	  their	   forms	  of	  community	   life	  on	  that	  territory.”64	  Respect	   for	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  these	  wild	  animals	  sometimes	  requires	  non-­‐interference,	  but	  it	  also	  imposes	  cer-­‐tain	   positive	   obligations,	   such	   as	   protecting	   habitats	   and	   assisting	   during	   natural	  disasters.	  Second	   are	   “liminal	   animals—wild	   animals	   living	   in	   close	   association	   with	  humans.”65	  Donaldson	  and	  Kymlicka	  here	  have	  in	  mind	  those	  non-­‐domesticated	  an-­‐imals	   that	   live	  among	  us:	   squirrels,	  mice,	   rats,	   sparrows,	   raccoons,	   skunks,	  and	  so	  forth.66	   Their	   in-­‐between	   status	   as	   neither	   domesticated	   nor	   wilderness	   animals	  makes	  them	  liminal:	  neither	  co-­‐citizen	  nor	  sovereign.	  They	  are	  “akin	  to	  migrants	  or	  
                                                            	   57.	  	   Id.	  at	  60-­‐61.	  	   58.	  	   Id.	  at	  79-­‐80.	  	   59.	  	   Id.	  at	  138.	  	   60.	  	   Id.	  	  	   61.	  	   Id.	  at	  156.	  	   62.	  	   See	  generally	  id.	  at	  27.	  	   63.	  	   Id.	  at	  205.	  	   64.	  	   Id.	  at	  205-­‐06.	  	   65.	  	   Id.	  at	  	  156.	  	   66.	  	   Id.	  at	  210.	  
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 49 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 24
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss2/24
2013]	   CITIZEN	  RUFF	   549	  
denizens	  who	  choose	  to	  move	  into	  areas	  of	  human	  habitation.”67	  To	  these	  animals	  Donaldson	  and	  Kymlicka	  apply	  a	  model	  of	  denizenship.	  We	  must	  respect	  their	  basic	  rights	   and	   extend	   to	   them	   various	   positive	   obligations.	   These	   include	   reasonable	  accommodation	  of	  their	  interests	  in	  the	  way	  we	  develop	  the	  human-­‐built	  environ-­‐ment	  and	  positive	   forms	  of	  assistance	  when	   these	  can	  be	  undertaken	  without	  un-­‐dermining	  their	  basic	  liberty	  and	  autonomy.”68	  Though	  extermination	  and	  eviction	  are	  not	  acceptable	  responses	  to	  liminal	  animal	  denizens,	  “it	  is	  legitimate	  for	  humans	  to	  limit	  increases	  in	  liminal	  populations,	  and	  to	  manage	  their	  mobility	  and	  access.”69	  
Zoopolis	   offers	  many	   detailed	   recommendations	   for	   human	   interaction	  with	  domesticated,	   wild,	   and	   liminal	   animals.	   At	   other	   times,	   the	   authors	   admit	   that	  much	  more	  needs	  to	  be	  spelled	  out	  to	  implement	  their	  broad	  recommendations.	  For	  example,	  institutional	  mechanisms	  would	  need	  to	  be	  established	  to	  facilitate	  the	  po-­‐litical	   representation	   of	   animal	   co-­‐citizens.70	   While	   Donaldson	   and	   Kymlicka	   cite	  possible	   models	   for	   such	   implementation	   (e.g.,	   animal	   “defenders”	   or	   “ombuds-­‐men”),	  they	  leave	  open	  some	  of	  these	  details	  for	  future	  development.71	  Donaldson	   and	   Kymlicka	   recognize	   the	   heavy	   demands	   their	   recommenda-­‐tions	  impose72	  and	  are	  realistic	  in	  noting	  the	  limited	  prospects	  for	  dramatic	  change	  in	  human	  relations	  with	  nonhumans.73	  But	  they	  are	  also	  hopeful,	  aiming	  to	  articu-­‐late	  a	   “more	  positive	  and	  creative	  vision—one	   that	   recognizes	   that	  human-­‐animal	  relations	  can	  be	  compassionate,	  just,	  joyful,	  and	  mutually	  enriching.”74	  II.	  ANIMALS	  AS	  MEMBERS	  OF	  THE	  SOCIAL	  CONTRACT:	  GOVERNING	  ANIMALS	  Like	   Donaldson	   and	   Kymlicka,	   Kimberly	   K.	   Smith	   sets	   out	   to	   articulate	   the	  kinds	  of	  obligations	  humans	  have	  toward	  nonhumans.75	  More	  precisely,	  Smith	  is	  in-­‐terested	   in	   the	  political	  obligations	   that	  citizens	  and	   the	   liberal	   state	  have	   toward	  animals.76	  Emphasizing	  that	  hers	  is	  a	  work	  of	  political	  theory	  rather	  than	  moral	  phi-­‐losophy,	  Smith	  begins	  by	  assuming	  that	  animals	  have	  moral	  standing	  and	  interests,	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  animals	  vary	  depending	  on	  sentience	  and	  intelligence,	  and	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  animals	  can	  be	  identified.	  With	  these	  starting	  points,	  she	  proposes	  to	  develop	  a	  liberal	  political	  theory	  to	  determine	  whether	  a	  liberal	  government	  can	  legitimately	   protect	   the	  welfare	   of	   animals.77	   To	  make	   sense	   of	   our	   relationships	  with	  animals,	  Smith	  argues,	  we	  need:	  	   [A]	  deeper,	  richer	  ethic	  for	  our	  treatment	  of	  animals—an	  ethic	  ap-­‐propriate	  to	  their	  biological,	  ecological,	  and	  social	  natures.	  But	  we	  
                                                            	   67.	  	   Id.	  at	  14.	  	   68.	  	   Id.	  at	  251.	  	   69.	  	   Id.	  	  	   70.	  	   Id.	  at	  209.	  	  	   71.	  	   Id.	  at	  154.	  	   72.	  	   Id.	  at	  	  255.	  	   73.	  	   Id.	  at	  252.	  	   74.	  	   Id.	  at	  255.	  	   75.	  	   See	  generally	  SMITH,	  supra	  note	  24.	  	   76.	  	   	  Id.	  at	  xii.	  	   77.	  	   Id.	  at	  34-­‐35.	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also	  need	  a	  public	  philosophy	  that	  explains	  the	  respective	  roles	  of	  government,	  civil	  society,	  and	  private	  individuals	  in	  governing	  the	  mixed	   human/animal	   community,	   along	   with	   new	   practices	   and	  institutions	  that	  facilitate	  meaningful	  and	  justifiable	  relations	  with	  our	  fellow	  creatures.	  We	  need	  a	  public	  philosophy	  that	  recognizes,	  as	  Vicki	  Hearne	  says,	  that	  the	  good	  of	  the	  human	  polis	  depends	  on	  the	  happiness	  of	  animals.78	  	  One	  of	   the	  primary	  challenges	  with	   constructing	   such	  a	   theory,	   as	  Smith	  ex-­‐plains	  it,	  is	  that	  liberal	  political	  theory	  traditionally	  limits	  the	  role	  of	  government	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  welfare.79	  	  	   Cruelty	  toward	  animals	  may	  be	  morally	  repugnant,	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  follow	  that	  the	  state	  has	  authority	  to	  prevent	  it	  .	  .	  .	  .	  It	  is	  a	  basic	  principle	  of	  liberal	  government	  that	  the	  state’s	  coercive	  power	  should	  be	  used	  only	  for	  certain	  purposes:	  to	  make	  its	  members	  safe	  and	  healthy	  and	  free,	  not	  to	  make	  them	  good.80	  	  	  The	   problem	   facing	   efforts	   to	   legislate	   on	   behalf	   of	   animal	   welfare,	   then,	   is	  this:	   “If	   the	   purpose	   of	   government	   is	   to	   protect	  human	  welfare	   and	   freedom,	   on	  what	  grounds	  does	  the	  government	  restrict	  our	  freedom	  to	  treat	  animals	  any	  way	  we	  please?”81	  A	  common	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  relies	  precisely	  on	  appeals	  to	  human	  wel-­‐fare	   and	   interests,	   arguing	   that	   animal	   protection	   benefits	   humans.	   This	   answer,	  Smith	  contends,	  does	  not	  get	  us	  very	  far,	  in	  part	  because	  many	  forms	  of	  animal	  mis-­‐treatment	  do	  not	  harm	  humans.82	  What’s	  more,	   given	   the	   limited	  authority	  of	   the	  liberal	  state,	  the	  question	  becomes:	  “Why	  should	  the	  government	  ever	  be	  allowed	  to	  protect	  animals	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  human	  interests?”83	  Smith’s	  answer	  to	  this	  ques-­‐tion	   is	   that	   some	  animals	  are	  members	  of	   the	  political	   community—that	   is,	  mem-­‐bers	  of	  the	  social	  contract—and	  thus	  owed	  protection	  by	  the	  liberal	  state.84	  This	  is	  the	  only	  answer	  that	  “makes	  sense	  in	  light	  of	  the	  liberal	  tradition	  and	  the	  practices	  of	  modern	  liberal	  communities	  .	  .	  .	  .”85	  But	  there	  are	  challenges	  to	  extending	  social	  contract	  theory	  to	  animals.	  In	  par-­‐ticular,	  social	  contract	  theory	  traditionally	  is	  thought	  to	  apply	  only	  to	  beings	  capa-­‐ble	  of	   entering	   into	   contracts,	   and	  animals	  obviously	   cannot	   consent	   to	   contracts.	  Smith	  responds	  to	  this	  challenge	  by	  offering	  a	  revised	  conception	  of	  social	  contract	  
                                                            	   78.	  	   Id.	   at	   34.	   (citing	   VICKI	   HEARNE,	   ANIMAL	   HAPPINESS:	   A	   MOVING	   EXPLORATION	   OF	   ANIMALS	   AND	   THEIR	  EMOTIONS	  (1994)).	  	   79.	  	   SMITH,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	  	  35.	  	   80.	  	   Id.	  at	  40.	  	   81.	  	   Id.	  	  	   82.	  	   Id.	  	  	   83.	  	   Id.	  at	  41.	  	   84.	  	   Id.	  	   85.	  	   Id.	  Smith	  adds	  the	  caveat	  here	  that	  she	  uses	  the	  “social	  contract	  device	  not	  as	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  moral	  obligation	  but	  merely	  as	  a	  way	  to	  think	  about	  political	  obligation	  in	  a	  liberal	  state.”	  Id.	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theory:86	  	   The	   social	   contract,	   as	   it	   is	   used	   in	   political	   theory	   and	   practical	  politics,	  usually	  includes	  everyone	   in	  a	  given	  political	  society,	  even	  those	  (like	  infants	  and	  the	  severely	  mentally	  impaired)	  incapable	  of	  consenting.	  You	  don’t	  have	  to	  sign	  up;	  you	  don’t	  have	  to	  give	  actual	  consent,	  either	  explicit	  or	  implicit.	  If	  you	  have	  significant	  social	  re-­‐lations	  with	  other	  members	  of	  the	  community,	  you’re	  a	  member.	  Of	  course	   we	   often	   have	   trouble	   with	   marginal	   cases	   (immigrants	  seeking	  membership,	  for	  example).	  But	  many	  animals	  are	  not	  hard	  cases;	  they	  are	  clearly	  part	  of	  our	  social	  community.	  We	  have	  social	  relations	  with	  our	  pets—or	  at	  least	  an	  overwhelmingly	  large	  num-­‐ber	  of	  us	  do.	  We	  communicate	  with	  them,	  recognize	  duties	  toward	  them,	  interact	  with	  them,	  and	  recognize	  the	  social	  value	  of	  these	  re-­‐lationships.	   Indeed,	  many	  people	   consider	   pets	   to	   be	  members	   of	  the	  family.87	  	  That	  animals	  cannot	  consent	  to	  the	  contract	  is	  not,	  according	  to	  Smith,	  deter-­‐minative	  of	  whether	   they	  are	  members	  of	   the	  political	   community.	  Rather,	   “those	  animals	  that	  the	  human	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  recognize	  as	  having	  welfare	  or	  liberty	   interests	   .	  .	  .	  may	   properly	   be	   included	   in	   the	   social	   contract.”88	  Moreover,	  “membership	  in	  the	  social	  contract	  is	  limited	  to	  animals	  with	  whom	  we	  have	  social	  relationships.”89	  Which	   animals	   are	   these?	  Here,	   Smith	   asserts	   that	   certain	   types	   of	   relation-­‐ships	  with	   animals	   provide	   grounding	   for	   their	   inclusion	   in	   (and	   exclusion	   from)	  the	  social	  contract.90	  Political	  relationships	  of	  care	  and	  dependence	  are	  the	  sort	  that	  merit	  membership	  in	  the	  contract.91	  Pets	  and	  livestock	  are	  members,	  living	  with	  us	  “in	  close	  relations	  of	  interdependence	  and	  mutuality.”92	  “Commensal	  animals,	  such	  as	   the	  birds	  who	  visit	   our	  birdfeeders,	  might	   also	  qualify	   for	  membership.”93	  And	  confined	  wild	  animals,	   like	  those	  in	  zoos,	  “become	  public	  pets	  of	  a	  sort	   .	   .	   .	   .”94	  But	  most	  wild	  animals	   fall	  outside	   the	  scope	  of	   the	   social	   contract.95	  Similarly,	   “pests”	  are	  not	  members.96	  “Their	  interests	  cannot,	  by	  definition,	  be	  harmonized	  with	  ours,	  and	  therefore	  they	  are	  not	  properly	  speaking	  engaged	  in	  a	  scheme	  of	  social	  cooper-­‐ation	  with	  us.	  Politically	  speaking,	  pests	  are	  our	  enemies,	  so	  our	  laws	  do	  not	  have	  to	  
                                                            	   86.	  	   Id.	  at	  53-­‐57.	  	  	   87.	  	   Id.	  at	  48.	  	   88.	  	   Id.	  at	  53.	  	  	   89.	  	   Id.	  at	  55.	  	  	   90.	  	   Id.	  at	  57-­‐68.	  	   91.	  	   Id.	  at	  62.	  	  	   92.	  	   Id.	  at	  63.	  	  	   93.	  	   Id.	  	  	   94.	  	   Id.	  	  	   95.	  	   Id.	  	  	   96.	  	   Id.	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take	  their	  interests	  into	  account.”97	  Classifying	  which	   animals	   fall	   within	   the	   social	   contract,	   Smith	   is	   careful	   to	  distinguish	   between	   political	   obligations	   and	  moral	   duties.	   Her	   goal,	   she	   reminds	  the	  reader,	  is	  to	  spell	  out	  the	  former.	  While	  pests	  and	  most	  wild	  animals	  are	  not,	  in	  her	  analysis,	  members	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  and	  thus	  not	  the	  political	  responsibility	  of	   the	   liberal	  state,	   they	  may	  be	  owed	  certain	  moral	  duties	  by	  private	   individuals.	  For	   example,	  we	  may	   have	  moral	   obligations	   to	   not	   inflict	   suffering	   on	   pests	   and	  wild	  animals.98	  But	  whether	  we	  have	  such	  moral	  obligations	  is	  not	  Smith’s	  question.	  On	  the	  flip	  side,	  Smith	  is	  also	  careful	  to	  emphasize	  that	  being	  a	  member	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  does	  not	  mean	  having	  rights	  equal	  to	  those	  of	  other	  members	  of	  the	  social	  contract.	  Thus,	  while	  livestock	  are,	  on	  Smith’s	  account,	  members	  of	  the	  social	  contract,	   we	   can	   still	   consume	   them.99	   Smith’s	   application	   of	   the	   social	   contract	  “does	  not	  aim	  at	  protecting	  the	  autonomy	  of	  individual	  animals	  by	  recognizing	  their	  natural	  rights.	  Rather,	  it	  aims	  at	  protecting	  individual	  animal	  welfare	  by	  protecting	  good	  human/animal	  relationships.	  The	  best	  protection	  for	  animal	  welfare	  is	  to	  pro-­‐mote	   these	   relationships	   by	   supporting	   good	   practices	   of	   animal	   husbandry	   and	  stewardship.”100	  Relatedly,	   Smith	   argues	   that	   inclusion	  of	   animals	   in	   the	   social	   contract	   does	  not	  preclude	  ownership	  of	  animals.101	  To	   the	  contrary,	   she	  offers	  a	  new	  theory	  of	  property	   as	   it	   pertains	   to	   animals.	   She	  posits	   “an	   alternative	   to	   banning	  property	  rights	  in	  animals	  altogether”	  and	  emphasizes	  custodial	  arrangements	  “in	  which	  the	  owners’	  rights	  in	  the	  animal	  are	  subject	  to	  a	  general	  duty	  to	  care	  for	  its	  welfare.”102	  Drawing	   on	   the	  work	   of	   David	   Favre,	   who	   calls	   for	   “equitable	   self-­‐ownership”	   of	  domestic	  animals,103	  Smith	  explains	  that	  “an	  animals’	  guardian	  (holding	  legal	  title)	  would	  have	  property	  rights	  in	  the	  animal	  against	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  but	  would	  be	  bound	  to	  make	  decisions	  with	  the	  animal’s	  best	  interest	  in	  mind.”104	  Smith	  asserts	  that	  this	  “model	  of	  equitable	  self-­‐ownership	  seems	  to	  respect	  the	  social	  meaning	  of	  animals	   and	   their	   role	   in	   the	  mixed	  community.	  Moreover,	   it	   can	  be	  used	   for	   ani-­‐mals	  without	  doing	  violence	  to	  our	  traditional	  legal	  concepts;	  it	  fits	  neatly	  into	  the	  structure	  of	  American	  property	  law.”105	  Concerning	  livestock,	  Smith	  expresses	  concern	  with	  the	  mass	  production	  and	  the	  resulting	  commodification	  of	  animals,	  which	  harms	  their	  welfare	  and	  “violates	  their	   social	  meaning	   .	   .	   .	   .”106	  Not	  all	   treatment	  of	   livestock	   risks	   commodification,	  according	  to	  Smith.	  But	  mass	  production	  often	  does,	  and	  Smith	  argues	  “that	  the	  wel-­‐fare	   of	   the	   animals	   themselves	   constitutes	   a	   fully	   adequate	   reason	   for	   (limited)	  state	  intervention	  in	  pet	  and	  livestock	  production,	  even	  at	  some	  cost	  to	  human	  lib-­‐
                                                            	   97.	   Id.	  	  	   98.	  	   Id.	  	  	   99.	  	   Id.	  at	  66.	  	   100.	  	   Id.	  at	  	  69.	  	  	   101.	  	   Id.	  at	  97.	  	   102.	  	   Id.	  at	  85.	  	  	   103.	  	   David	  Favre,	  Equitable	  Self-­‐Ownership	  for	  Animals,	  50	  DUKE	  L.J.	  473,	  476	  (2000).	  	   104.	  	   SMITH,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	  85.	  	  	   105.	  	   Id.	  	  	   106.	  	   Id.	  at	  94.	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erty	  and	  autonomy”:107	  	   Animals,	   and	   particularly	   domesticated	   animals,	   are	   acutely	   vul-­‐nerable	   to	  mistreatment	  and	  are	   therefore	  particularly	  dependent	  on	   strong	   norms	   of	   good	   care.	   Any	   practice	   that	   systematically	  treats	  them	  as	  commodities	  is	  likely	  to	  undermine	  those	  norms	  and	  will	  probably	  lead	  to	  poor	  care.	  This	  rationale	  justifies	  government	  regulation	  aimed	  at	  enforcing	  minimum	  levels	  of	  animal	  welfare	  in	  the	   pet	   and	   livestock	   trades.	   It	   can	   also	   support	   using	   some	   gov-­‐ernment	   resources	   to	  promote	  a	   culture	  of	  good	  animal	  husband-­‐ry—at	  least	  where	  there	  is	  already	  a	  broad	  social	  consensus	  about	  what	  the	  culture	  entails.108	  	  These	  concerns	  notwithstanding,	  Smith’s	  vision	  of	   the	  permissible	  treatment	  of	  farm	  animals	  and	  theory	  of	  property	  in	  those	  animals	  permit	  raising	  animals	  for	  food	  and	  other	  uses.109	  “[I]f	  we	  are	  going	  to	  raise	  animals	  for	  food,	  we	  must	  consider	  them	  members	  and	  accept	  all	  the	  responsibilities	  that	  entails.”110	  But	  protecting	  the	  welfare	  and	  best	  interests	  of	  livestock	  does	  not,	  on	  Smith’s	  account,	  include	  protect-­‐ing	  their	  lives.	  Smith	  further	  explains	  that	  under	  her	  call	  for	  extending	  social	  contract	  theory,	  institutions	   can	  be,	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   already	  have	  been,	   developed	   to	   represent	  animals.	  She	  argues	  that	  legal	  and	  political	  representation	  of	  animal	  interests	  is	  fea-­‐sible	  and	  consistent	  with	  theories	  of	  the	  liberal	  state.	  Smith	  draws	  on	  analogies	  to	  the	  representation	  of	  children’s	  welfare	  to	  make	  the	  case	  that	  those	  animals	  falling	  within	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  can	  be	  represented.111	  III.	  COMPETING	  VERSIONS,	  VISIONS,	  AND	  DIVISIONS	  There	  are	  several	  notable	  affinities	  between	  Zoopolis	  and	  Governing	  Animals.	  As	  already	  noted,	  both	  works	  are	  situated	  within	  political	  theory	  and,	  indeed,	  liber-­‐al	  political	  theory;	  both	  aim	  to	  identify	  the	  political	  obligations	  humans	  have	  toward	  nonhuman	  animals;	  both	  emphasize	  relationships;	  and	  both	  extend	  related	  concepts	  with	   liberal	   political	   thought—citizenship	   and	   the	   social	   contract—to	   human-­‐animal	  interactions.	  These	  affinities	  should	  not	   lead	  us	   to	  overlook	  a	  critical	  point	  of	  divergence.	  
Zoopolis	   assumes	   that	   sentient	   or	   conscious	   animals	   have	   rights	   that	  must	   be	   re-­‐spected	  within	   the	   political	   community	   and	   through	   our	   relationships	  with	   them.	  
Governing	   Animals	  assumes	   that	   animals	   have	  moral	   standing,	   but	   otherwise	   sets	  aside	  moral	  questions.	  While	   it	  may	  be	  unethical	   to	   raise	  animals	   for	   food,	   that	   is	  not,	  according	   to	  Smith,	  an	  appropriate	  matter	  of	  governance	   for	   the	   liberal	   state.	  
                                                            	   107.	  	   Id.	  at	  97.	  	  	   108.	  	   Id.	  	  	   109.	  	   Id.	  at	  66.	  	   110.	  	   Id.	  	   111.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  id.	  at	  122.	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Prohibiting	  the	  consumption	  of	  animals	  for	  moral	  reasons	  would	  amount	  to	  undue	  interference	   into	   private,	   ethical	   decision-­‐making.	   By	   contrast,	   Donaldson	   and	  Kymlicka	  assume	  and	  assert	  that	  we	  must	  respect	  certain	  universal	  negative	  rights	  that	  apply	   to	  animals,	   including	  rights	  against	   torture,	  enslavement,	  and	  killing.112	  This	  assumption	  gets	  Donaldson	  and	  Kymlicka	  to	  a	  very	  different	  place	  and	  set	  of	  recommendations.	   In	   short,	   liberal	   political	   theory	   undergirds	   the	   similarities	   of	  these	   two	  works,	   but	   it	   also	  divides	   them	  because	   the	  versions	  of	   liberal	  political	  theory	  that	  ground	  these	  works	  are	  notably	  distinct.	  As	  such,	   the	  extension	  to	   the	  case	  of	  animals	  generates	  widely	  disparate	  conclusions.	  The	   framing	   of	   the	   two	   works	   also	   serves	   as	   a	   notable	   point	   of	   departure.	  From	  Donaldson	   and	  Kymlicka’s	   vantage	   point,	   there	   is	   a	   gap	   in	   ART	   and	   an	   im-­‐passe	  within	   the	  progressive	   animal	   advocacy	  movement.	  The	  goal	  of	   closing	   this	  gap	   and	  overcoming	   the	   impasse	   animates	   their	  work.	  By	   contrast,	   the	   issue	   that	  animates	   Smith’s	   analysis	   concerns	   liberal	   political	   theory	   and,	   in	   particular,	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  way	  to	  make	  animal	  welfare	  practices	  fit	  within	  a	  theory	  that	  is	  traditionally	  anthropocentric.	  The	   juxtaposition	  of	   these	   two	  works	  serves	   to	   illuminate	   their	   comparative	  merits.	   If	  we	   accept	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   the	   analysis	   the	   starting	   assumption	   of	   these	  works—that	  certain	  animals	  have	  moral	  standing—what	  Smith	  offers	   is	  a	  particu-­‐larly	  thin	  version	  of	  liberalism	  that	  advocates	  a	  rather	  limited	  conception	  of	  legiti-­‐mate	   state	   action.	   The	   extension	   of	   that	   version	   of	   liberalism	   to	   animals	   and	   the	  conclusions	  it	  generates	  will	  necessarily	  be	  thin.	  Robust	  calls	  for	  animal	  welfare,	  let	  alone	  animal	  rights,	  will	  be	  (and	  indeed	  are)	  limited	  under	  her	  analysis.	  By	  contrast,	  Donaldson	  and	  Kymlicka	  adopt	  a	  thicker	  version	  of	  liberalism.	  Of	  course,	  the	  persuasiveness	  of	  their	  conclusions	  is	  based,	   in	  part,	  on	  which	  account	   of	   liberal	   theory	   one	   accepts.	   But	   even	   setting	   this	   aside,	  Zoopolis,	   in	  my	  view,	  succeeds	  in	  offering	  a	  more	  compelling	  analysis	  than	  Governing	  Animals.	  For	  one	   thing,	  Smith’s	  analysis	  presents	  a	   somewhat	  under-­‐theorized	  argument	  about	  whether	  and	  which	  animals	  are	  rightly	  seen	  as	  members	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  and	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  member	  of	  that	  contract.	  Donaldson	  and	  Kymlicka’s	  account	  presents	  a	  richer	  and	  more	  complicated	  theoretical	  intervention.	  In	  particular,	  their	  recasting	  of	  citizenship	  is	  instructive,	  and	  their	  extension	  of	  notions	  of	  citizenship,	  sovereignty,	   and	  denizenship	   to	  animals	   is	   insightful.	  They	  do	  well	   in	  anticipating	  and	   responding	   to	  objections.	  And	   they	  are	  mindful	   that	   their	   analysis	  provides	  a	  beginning,	  though	  not	  the	  end,	  of	  the	  analysis.	  In	  addition,	  while	   there	   is	   theoretical	  plausibility	   to	   the	  case	  Smith	  makes	   in	  
Governing	   Animals,	   there	   is	   also,	   at	   bottom,	   considerable	   tension	   in	   the	   idea	   that	  members	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  can	  be	  raised	  and	  slaughtered	  for	  food.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	   see	   how	   social	   contract	   theory	   is	   elastic	   enough	   to	   allow	   for	   routine	   killing	   of	  some	  members	  of	  the	  contract	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  other	  members.	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  that	  the	  social	  contract	  device	  can	  withstand	  or	  be	  modified	  to	  include	  such	  an	  arrange-­‐ment.	  There	  is,	  to	  be	  sure,	  also	  some	  tension	  in	  Donaldson	  and	  Kymlicka’s	  concep-­‐tion	  of	  animals	  as	  co-­‐citizens.	  Does	   the	  concept	  of	   citizenship	  comfortably	  permit,	  
                                                            	   112.	  	   DONALDSON	  &	  KYMLICKA,	  supra	  note	  23,	  at	  49.	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for	  example,	  harvesting	  and	  eating	  the	  eggs	  of	  chicken	  citizens?	  This,	  however,	  is	  far	  more	  plausible	  and	  does	   less	   to	  undermine	   the	   concept	  of	   citizenship	   than	  killing	  animals	  does	  to	  undermine	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  and	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  member	  of	  that	  contract.	  
Zoopolis	   is	  not	  without	   its	   limitations.	  For	  example,	  even	  though	  the	  authors	  do	   generally	   well	   in	   responding	   to	   anticipated	   criticisms,	   they	   could	   have	   taken	  more	   time	   to	   answer	   the	   cosmopolitan	   challenge	   to	   citizenship	   theory.	   As	   Don-­‐aldson	  and	  Kymlicka	  note,	   some	  cosmopolitans	   reject	   the	  distinctions	  among	  uni-­‐versal	  rights,	  citizen	  rights,	  and	  denizen	  rights,	  arguing	  instead	  that	  “everyone	  eve-­‐rywhere	   should	   automatically	   have	   their	   interests	   counted	   equally	   in	   political	  decision-­‐making	   .	   .	   .	   .”113	  Cosmopolitan	  theory	  thus	  poses	  a	  direct	  challenge	  to	   the	  type	   of	   citizenship	   theory	   put	   forward	   in	   Zoopolis.	   Donaldson	   and	   Kymlicka’s	   re-­‐sponse	  to	  this	  challenge	  is	  to	  note	  some	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  “commitment	  to	  bound-­‐ed	  citizenship”	  and	  to	  then	  “assume	  that	  liberal	  political	  theory	  operates	  in	  a	  world	  of	  bounded	  political	  communities	  .	  .	  .	  .”114	  This	  is,	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  fair	  enough,	  but	  it	  will	  not	  be	  particularly	   satisfying	   to	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  political	   theory	   that	  views	  moral	  and	  political	  communities	  in	  more	  boundless	  ways.	  IV.	  CONCLUSION	  When	  I	  consider	  the	  reactions	  to	  Blackfish,	   I	  wonder	  whether	  it	  will	  succeed,	  as	  one	  reviewer	  speculated,	   in	   inspiring	  real	  reform	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  kinship	  to	  ani-­‐mals.115	   When	   I	   consider	   the	   recent	   developments	   on	   animal	   experimentation,	   I	  wonder	  whether	  they	  will	  be	  sweeping	  or	  be	  limited	  by	  justifications	  that	  note	  how	  chimpanzees	  are	  “our	  closest	  living	  relatives.”116	  And	  when	  I	  read	  works	  like	  Zoopo-­‐
lis	  and	  Governing	  Animals,	  I	  wonder	  whether	  and	  how	  much	  traction	  can	  be	  gained	  by	  further	  theorizing.	  On	  this	  count	  and	  in	  conclusion,	   I	  note	  the	  following:	  Zoopolis	  and	  Governing	  
Animals	   are	   both	   worthwhile	   exercises	   of	   political	   theory.	   They	   raise	   interesting	  questions,	   seek	   to	   fill	   important	   gaps	   in	   our	   theoretical	   frames,	   and	   advance	   our	  conceptions	  especially	   in	  the	  realm	  of	   liberal	  political	  thought.	  They	  will	   therefore	  be	  of	  interest	  at	  least	  to	  scholars	  who	  study	  political	  theory,	  moral	  philosophy,	  and	  law.	  Both	  works	  will	  also	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  those	  beyond	  the	  academy.	  Both	  are	  well	  written,	  and,	  while	  academic	  and	   theoretical	   in	  orientation,	   they	  are	  readable	  and	  accessible.	  In	  my	  estimation,	  though,	  Zoopolis	  has	  broader	  value	  than	  Governing	  An-­‐
imals.	  This	   is,	   in	  part,	  because	  I	   judge	  the	  public	  discourse	  surrounding	  notions	  of	  citizenship	  to	  have	  broader	  appeal	  than	  the	  public	  discourse	  surrounding	  the	  social	  contract.	  There	   is	  strong	  value	   in	  the	  citizenship	   framework,	   its	  related	  notions	  of	  sovereignty	   and	   denizenship,	   and	   the	   repeated	   analogies	   that	   Donaldson	   and	  Kymlicka	  make	   to	   humans	  who	   fall	   into	   these	   categories.	   Moreover,	   while	   Smith	  
                                                            	   113.	  	   Id.	  at	  52.	  	  	   114.	  	   Id.	  at	  53.	  	  	   115.	  	   See	  Beifuss,	  supra	  note	  7.	  	   116.	  	   Chimpanzee,	  NATIONAL	  GEOGRAPHIC,	  http://animals.nationalgeographic.com/animals/mammals/chimpanzee/.	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seeks	   to	   articulate	   “a	   public	   philosophy	   that	   explains	   the	   respective	   roles	   of	   gov-­‐ernment,	   civil	   society,	   and	   private	   individuals	   in	   governing	   the	   mixed	   hu-­‐man/animal	  community,”117	  I	  think	  many	  will	  have	  difficulty	  accepting	  a	  public	  phi-­‐losophy	   under	   which	   the	   social	   contract	   is	   understood	   to	   allow	   some	   of	   its	  members	  to	  be	  raised	  and	  consumed	  in	  the	  ways	  that	  Smith’s	  theory	  permits.	  
                                                            	   117.	  	   SMITH,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	  34.	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